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Introduction
1 Professor Pye expresses her gratitude to the ESRC for their continued funding this work, under grant numbers WF 2925 0020 (1987-89), R 000236868
(1998-00) and RES-062-23-0782 (2009-2011), as well as to the many practitioners who have given generously of their time and experience in the course of
these studies. 
This report provides a synopsis of new research into the
small groups of people – senior executives and other board
members – who govern large, UK-listed companies. The
latest project, conducted between 2009 and 2011 by
Professor Annie Pye, is the third study in a series spanning
almost 25 years and represents a rare, academic insight into
corporate directing in FTSE companies. 
The title ‘Leading FTSE Companies’ is a deliberate play on
words. Drawing on its unique qualitative dataset of one-to-
one interviews, the research explores the ‘people side’ of
running high profile corporations and creates a ‘process-
oriented’ understanding, across time, of the shifting
relationships at the heart of Britain’s corporate system. 
The latest interviews took place during the greatest global
financial crisis since the 1930s. Public trust in business leaders
was low and the focus on corporate governance sharpened
considerably. However, there is more to corporate directing
than simply corporate governance.
The first study in this series predated the Cadbury Review
(1992) which first established the UK’s ‘comply or explain’
approach to corporate governance. Since then the role and
scope of regulators has changed significantly, and the
corporate governance industry has grown. 
While regulators cannot regulate behaviour per se, they seek
to facilitate an environment in which requisite behaviour
takes place. Given the recurring pattern of corporate
disasters which are then followed by ever-tightening
regulation, it is clear that regulation may be necessary but is
not necessarily enough to ensure appropriate conduct.
Constituents of the FTSE 100 continue to grow in size 
and influence in the global economy, yet like all corporate
leaders, their election and their decisions remain largely
obscured from public attention. 
The communications revolution since the first study in 1987
has created a very different context and tempo to conduct 
of business and directing. With information shared globally,
reputation and ownership can change in a matter of seconds. 
Academic research into corporate governance tends to focus
on quantitative analysis of board structural variables. There is
little which explores qualitatively the role which directors and
senior executives play in directing an organisation. 
Professor Pye’s research primarily concerns FTSE100
companies and has been funded by the Economic and 
Social Research Council throughout. More than 100
directors, investors, auditors, executive search companies
and regulators, participated in the recent interviews (see
Appendix 1) which was preceded by similar studies in 
1987-1989 and 1998-2000.
Each of the three studies has shown that it is not so much
what is said or done but, how it is said or done, and what is
given attention and how, which are critical to performance. 
This latest project highlights a variety of challenges and
paradoxes, such as contradictions in the role of non-
executive directors who act both as coach and referee; a
persistent feeling that ‘one-size-does-not-fit-all’ although
regulation and law may appear otherwise; and the need for
balance between challenge and constructive partnership in
how directors ‘do directing’.
This report first presents key findings in an Executive
Summary, followed by four sections, entitled: 
People and Directing; Remuneration; Ownership; 
and Looking Ahead – Points for Discussion.
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Executive summary
• Corporate governance regulation is necessary but not
sufficient in ensuring effective board conduct; it is people
who create and direct organisations.
• Directing is something people do together even though,
from a legal perspective, they carry out their fiduciary
duties on an individual basis. Thus the quality of their
interrelationships remains significant and the enduring aim
is to ensure the board as whole creates more than the
sum of its parts.
• There is more to corporate directing than corporate
governance. Responsibility for setting direction/strategy,
risk management, leadership, corporate conduct, reward
and incentives, reputation and performance remain key
elements of a director’s governance role.
• However, the effectiveness of ‘doing’ corporate directing
rests on people, process and purpose, underpinned by
values and judgement.
• A critical corporate governance question persists: who is
accountable to whom, for what, how, when and where,
and with what criteria for evaluation of accountability?
• Each decade has been characterised by increasing
regulation which has tended to lead to greater compliance
rather than spirited engagement and has not prevented
serious corporate scandals or financial crisis.
• Trust in business leaders is low at present, yet ever-
tightening regulation merely increases trust in the
regulatory system rather than in those being regulated.
• While there has been pressure for change, some of the
‘corporate super-tankers’ studied might require more than
has changed to date to turn them around, partly because
of deeply embedded practices. 
• The relationship between chairman and chief executive
remains crucial to board culture and conduct, with
powerful influence on the extent to which each director
can play their part most effectively.
• The role of chair is now seen as increasingly central to
board performance, not least as outlined in the FRC
(2011) Guidance on Board Effectiveness. However, the
process of learning and developing essential skills remains
largely predicated on prior experience.
• Regulatory changes have sharpened more clearly the role
of non-executive director, and have also exacerbated its
paradoxes: non-executive directors must effectively act 
as both coach and referee in that they are required to
support executives but also challenge them, as well as
remain ‘independent’.
• The role of directors and non-executives, in particular,
seems to become clearer when tackling crises, yet
paradoxically, had they previously been performing
effectively, crisis might have been avoided. It appears that
such events help focus attention and clarify purpose.
• Throughout this series of studies, the number of female
FTSE100 directors has been and remains pitifully low,
despite the increasing attention of government and
regulators, both in the UK and Europe. In contrast, the
number of directors who are not British nationals
continues to steadily increase.
• Judgement is perhaps the most valued attribute of a board
member, often likened to ‘common sense’. However,
common sense is culturally defined and, much like tribal
behaviour, is hard to change.
• Whilst only “known” in hindsight, judgement is presumed
the essential basis for foresight and strategic decision-
making.
• Respect, trust, awareness of process and mindfulness are
essential elements of directing. So too are integrity and
‘a sharp nose’ – for example, in knowing when and how
to ask searching questions in board meetings.
• Despite or perhaps because of the immense
responsibilities and challenges of FTSE corporate directing,
a strong sense of vitality, energy and enjoyment as well 
as skilful use of power and persuasion characterises the
colourful collage of contributors to this series of studies. 
This series of three research projects has been repeated approximately every ten years since 1987 and has 
generated many key findings over time. Selected highlights from the 2009-2011 research include:
2_
• Excessive executive pay levels are a ‘potential time bomb’,
causing concern amongst some contributors to the same
extent as the ‘excessive debt levels’ that rang alarm bells
for contributors to the study 10 years ago. 
• Boards exhibit herd-like behaviour in setting
remuneration, broadly using similar practices with 
regards to the component parts of packages and
benchmarking and the link between pay and performance
remains opaque.
• Given the deeply systemic, interconnected nature of
companies and their conduct, for example in executive
remuneration, there is little incentive for any of them to
change their practice.
• With the vastly different environment created by 
new technology, all roles and conduct have changed
significantly, with implications for when, where and how
directors do their jobs, issues are represented, and people
communicate and make decisions. 
• The inevitable information asymmetries between non-
executive and executive directors can be ameliorated by
relationships built on respect and trust, and may even
enable the astute non-executive director (NED) to ask
critical ‘dumb questions’.
• The changing nature of share ownership has had
profound and some say negative outcomes. Share trading
dominated by short-term investors, this encourages 
short-term corporate decisions, often to the detriment 
of companies, their longer-term ambitions and their
longer-term investors.
• While regulation (including the Stewardship Code) aims to
encourage greater openness and transparency, it appears
to push some activity back-stage or even off-stage: much
the same as 10 years ago, investor engagement often
does and sometimes must take place privately.
• The drive for increased skill and expertise amongst board
appointees potentially increases the concentration of the
gene pool amongst likely candidates, although clearly 
one-size-does-not- (and should not) fit-all.
• Regardless of reviews (e.g. Tyson, 2003; Davies, 2011)
and efforts (e.g. 30% Club) to increase the number of
women on boards, only about 12.5% of FTSE100 boards
(2010) were female. This raises the enduring question
about why are so few women appointed to boards.
• An important question remains with regard to
development of new directors – in the contemporary
climate and given their career experience, from where
and how will they come forward to ‘step up’ to the board
to be effective directors?
• In steering their companies amidst such complex and
choppy waters, old maps and tools will not be sufficient:
a strong moral compass is also essential to help
successfully accomplish corporate directing.
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Directing is something people do together although the legal
framework identifies directors’ fiduciary duties on an
individual basis, hence the importance of relationships and
their interconnectedness has not changed over the course
of these studies. The collective responsibility of a board is
achieved by a group of people, in part reflecting the dynamic
created by the chief executive (CE) and chair. This
relationship between chair and chief executive remains
central to board culture and director effectiveness, and the
constructive conduct of collective responsibility.
The boards of UK public limited companies have four major
roles: chair, chief executive, non-executive director (NED)
and executive director (ED). Most commonly, three to five
executive directors sit on a FTSE company board, with
between four and eight NEDs. However, the balance is
tipping towards fewer EDs on main boards and in some
cases, may ultimately (albeit covertly), be leading towards
a more two-tier board structure.
In the 1980s, company boards were generally seen as
docile and executives enjoyed considerable discretion in
running companies. This has changed significantly. The
environment is now more complex and more regulated,
investors and there is greater scrutiny by investors and 
the media.
The Higgs Review (2003 strengthened separation of 
the roles of chair and CE, affirmed the role of senior
independent director (SID) and broadened the remit of
NEDs. Its principles have been further developed in the
FRC (2011) Guidance for Board Effectiveness, providing
detailed guidance on the leadership role of the chair.
The latest guidance states that a board “should not
necessarily be a comfortable place”. Part-time “independent”
NEDs are expected to ask “challenging questions” based on
a sound knowledge of the business. Contributors frequently
underline the complexity and contradictions inherent in this
role, and most NEDs would prefer to spend less time on
compliance and more on developing strategy and
supporting executives.
Although strategy development appears to be a higher
priority for a wider group, the CE remains uniquely
responsible for developing and implementing strategy and,
in the sample interviewed, appears to rely less on external
consultants in this area than was previously the case. 
The latest Corporate Governance Code (2010) emphasises
the importance of long-term perspective and ‘leadership’.
Other similarly challenging responsibilities include risk
management and defining and ‘setting’ company values.
Most companies have high level risk evaluation processes
embedded in their financial systems and audit committee
functions. However, regardless of the ‘tools’, identifying and
evaluating risks and systemic risk requires interpretation and
judgement which inevitably reflects personal attitudes and
preferences.
‘People risk’ remains difficult to evaluate, even though 
the refrain ‘people are our primary strategic asset’ is still
frequently used. Understanding and developing the
leadership pipeline as well as board responsibility for
succession planning remain areas that are not always 
well addressed.
Corporate governance was an important mantra in the
1998-2000 project. In the current study it appears to be
part of the ‘world-taken-for-granted’ view, although there is
concern that over-regulation is potentially stifling initiative
and innovation.
The notion of board leadership remains a practical puzzle
and conceptual challenge. For some, it lies with the chair,
for others with the CE. More importantly, however, all
directors have a part in what, how and to what effect,
board leadership is enacted.
Fundamental to the CE-chair relationship is mutual respect
and trust, together with clarity of responsibility and
boundaries. This remains the central touchstone around
which board culture and director effectiveness pivots. It
provides a powerful dynamic which needs careful and
constructive counterbalance by well-chosen complementary
characters, not least to avoid concentration of power or
over-reliance on any single individual.
While there are formal principles governing the chair and
CE roles, in practice, effectiveness hinges on personalities
and styles – sometimes summed up, albeit simplistically, as
‘personal chemistry’. It is important that there is openness
and candour between the chair and CE and that they 
meet and/or talk regularly. When there is a dysfunctional
relationship between chair and CE, this is usually also
mirrored in board relationships and board culture.
People and directing 
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Informal contact has increased amongst directors.
Board meetings are often followed by dinner and an
overnight stay to ensure NEDs are better briefed. For this
reason, in some cases NEDs also receive minutes of
executive management group meetings together with a one
page summary and/or regular business update from the CE,
in between board meetings. This helps boards to make best
use of their time and engagement with each other. Many also
hold one meeting a year at an overseas subsidiary.
Attention to behaviour is critical and while regulation now
requires annual evaluation of board effectiveness, how this is
carried out varies widely. As one NED put it, with regards
to having his performance evaluated annually by his chair:
“It’s an embarrassed formality”. There is thus a danger of
returning to compliance with regulation rather than
constructive engagement with the full spirit of it.
While in 1987-89 the chair was often an invisible but quietly
influential figure especially within the City, this role is now
more clearly a corporate leadership position open to public
scrutiny. People skills are important and the chair still has a
significant part in maintaining relations with shareholders and
other external parties, such as the media.
“...people are tremendously wise with the benefit
of hindsight and everyone thinks everything is
terribly obvious with hindsight in a way that is
simply not remotely obvious at the time it is
happening.”
Chief Executive 
FTSE 100 CEs are more externally-oriented than before and
their job is undoubtedly 24/7. Many talk of the importance 
of ‘engaging’ with staff. However, competing priorities and
lack of time mean the metaphorical gap between senior
executives and frontline staff is probably wider than 
10 years ago.
The role of finance director (FD) has become more strategic
in the past decade, in some cases almost overlapping with
the traditional territory of a Chief Operating Officer.
The role of company secretary (Co Sec) has become much
more important since the first study in this series, in part
because of increasing regulatory compliance requirements. 
Perhaps best represented as a delicate balancing act between
reporting to the CE and accounting to the chair, Co Secs,
albeit often unnoticed, have considerable influence as
gatekeepers, in that they organise boards’ work such as
preparing their agendas, collating and distributing information,
and writing board and executive group minutes, as well as
overseeing the board evaluation process.
The presence, effect and responsibilities of NEDs have
grown considerably. Yet what involves being an effective
NED remains open for debate. They face the challenge of
working in constructive partnership with executive board
members while also ‘coaching’ and ‘refereeing’ them and
being required to remain ‘independent’ from them. The
ability to have clear purpose, priorities and principles 
remains critical. 
Other valued qualities include: listening, open-mindedness
and common sense. Common sense, however, is culturally
defined, based on deeply-held assumptions, values and
learned patterns of behaviour. Like most tribal behaviours,
these can be difficult to change. This cultural embeddedness
perhaps helps highlight why the status quo persists.
NEDs are charged with challenging and developing proposals
on strategy and not succumbing to group-think. Their role
requires them to look beyond day-to-day issues and provide
independent and balanced advice. Yet they are dependent
for information on the people – chair, CE and so on. On the
other hand, limited information enables NEDs to ask the
‘dumb question’. 
Being a NED requires considerable investment of time and
they are often considered to be undervalued and underpaid
despite their increased responsibility and in contrast to the
multiple increases in chair fees. Now required to have an
annual performance review with the chair, interestingly their
pay remains fee-based rather than performance-based.
Described as the ‘safety vale’ for institutions, the role of
senior independent director (SID) has become more
significant on boards. Responsible for appointing and
appointing the chair, they must be respected by EDs as well
as NEDs. SIDs are particularly important during crises or
major restructurings, when communication with other
company representatives becomes compromised. 
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Remuneration
“The pay for performance thing doesn’t
really work.” 
Investor, 2011, on executive pay. 
Executive pay is an area of concern yet some feel it gets 
too much attention. It is also characterised by herd-like
behaviours which show little sign of changing. As one
contributor put it, it is rather like ‘painting by numbers’:
companies use broadly the same component parts,
compiled by similar practices with regards to benchmarking,
and the link between pay and performance remains opaque.
In theory, remuneration is tied to performance management,
assuming people are motivated by money. It is used as the
primary tool for motivating executives and encouraging them
to achieve strategic goals. As such, it also reveals the
particular behaviour that is valued.
However, if long-term incentive plan letters (LTIPs) get put 
in the bottom drawer for three years, they can take on the
quality of ‘an expensive lottery ticket’, based on a ‘set and
forget’ principle. In other words, in such cases, the executive
will continue doing whatever s/he chooses to deliver on
his/her responsibilities, and the LTIP makes relatively little
difference in fine tuning their behaviour.
Far more information about remuneration is provided in
annual reports than previously but pay packages are
becoming more complex and thus harder to assess.
FTSE 100 company pay packages have also become
substantially larger. In 1987-1989, average FTSE 100 CE
salaries were estimated at £100,000 to £150,000. By 2009,
this had risen to approximately £4 million, with up to nine
different component parts. However, if CE pay was related
to share price performance it would not have risen so
dramatically.
While remuneration has increased dramatically, the three
core components – base salary, share options and long-term
incentive plans – remain relatively unchanged and the
quantum of pay is highly influenced by that of comparable
companies. This benchmarking can lead executives paid less
than their peers to see themselves as undervalued.
Many contributors were sceptical about the effectiveness of
linking pay and performance. There are also question marks
over the extent to which strategy and the key drivers of
value are adequately brought together in evaluating individual
performance in this way.
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Ownership
While the world of financial services has changed significantly,
fundamentally much still rests on human relationships and
human judgement. The interface between shareholders and
company boards, a key link in the chain of accountabilities,
has changed considerably since 1987-1989. But directors
and regulators face special challenges in that financial services
is a densely interwoven, fast-changing system and network of
relationships, adding significant complexity to their roles.
In the 1998-2000 study, the larger institutional investors had
considerable influence over a company’s management. Since
then, company ownership has fragmented. With far-reaching
changes in technology and the now global reach of the
investment industry, about 30 per cent of shares traded daily
on the London Stock Exchange are computer software-
generated trades retained for an average of 11 seconds, and
some 40 per cent of UK equity is held by overseas investors.
The latest Act, however, does at last define seven principles
of a director. 
The often lengthy chain of intermediation between
shareholders and boards is further compounded by the fact
that investors have widely-varying agendas and interests,
different measures and different time horizons, akin to Ira
Millstein’s analogy of an overgrown vegetable patch: “…all of
the same species, but there is almost an infinite variety with
many dissimilar characteristics”.
The notion of ownership is also worth questioning. This
term was not used in the Companies Act (1985) and
appears only 5 times, usually in reference to founder-owner
businesses, amidst the 700+ pages, 47 Parts and 1,300
propositions of the Companies Act 2006.
Longer-term investors such as pension fund managers are
the most likely investor category to exercise their ownership
rights through direct active engagement, and as encouraged
by the Stewardship Code, although collective engagement
remains rare. 
The Corporate Governance Code (2010) requires listed
companies to describe their business model and strategy in
annual reports and accounts. But annual reports continue to
be conduits for good news, if not hubris, such that many
companies play up the good, and gloss over or leave out 
the negative.
The CE and FD together with the Head of Investor Relations
remain the main personal links between board and investor.
Chairs typically become involved when performance is of
concern. CEs estimate they continue to spend around 25
per cent of their time on this element of their role.
“The tragedy of the way the City operates is that it is
structurally short-term. It does a disservice to its clients
at both ends…The company is getting bad advice and
doing things of a short-term nature…and you are not
being represented as the long-term owner.”
Investor, 2011
The role of an external auditor is considered by many to be
at a crossroads, with the gap between what is expected of
auditors and what they do said to be widening. The depth
and degree of financial detail has grown to such an extent
that the level to which the external audit can drill down into
corporate practice is particularly challenging. This area
remains an ongoing focus for regulatory attention. Unlike
French businesses, it remains rare for FTSE companies to
have two concurrent external auditors.
Audit aims to ensure that companies supply fair and truthful
information, and many retain the same auditor for lengthy
periods. The oligopoly of the Big Four audit firms among
FTSE 350 companies persists and they also provide
extensive consulting services. Paradoxically, they may have
deeper knowledge of their clients but this also has the
potential to undermine their objectivity and independence,
causing concerns about conflicts of interest. 
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Looking ahead –
points for discussion
This research has generated many findings which open up further questions. These include:
• With each business cycle across the course of these three
studies (i.e. success followed by disaster/scandal, then
regulation and finally recovery), the impact and
consequences have been getting tougher, wider and
longer-lasting. Yet increasing regulation each time 
merely increases trust in a system of rules and their
implementation rather than in the people being regulated.
With this pattern now being amplified by the ever-
deepening global entanglement of finance, economics and
corporate practices, is global regulation now the only
solution and if not, what else must happen?
• When taking on a director role, it is still considered by
many to mean ‘stepping up’ to the board: that is, a unique
level of engagement and responsibility for EDs and once in
place, a distinctively different portfolio of responsibilities
and relationships for NEDs. So how does one successfully
achieve this transitioning process? 
• While UK companies are still assumed to be governed by
a unitary board, it increasingly appears that, with a strong
executive team and perhaps only two EDs on the main
board, UK boards are effectively becoming two-tier
structures. What are the implications of this trend?
• How can boards best ensure constructive engagement
between EDs and NEDs and create a board culture that
facilitates effective director behaviour? 
• How do we bring about greater diversity and better
representation of women on corporate boards and 
also address the implications for developing the board
leadership pipeline?
• How can external evaluation of board effectiveness 
be strengthened, given that it can be highly variable to 
the extent that some directors consider it worse than
worthless?
• Many argue that it is good practice for EDs to undertake a
NED role so that they learn what it is like and also tend to
make better use of their own NEDs. But given current
roles, responsibilities and regulatory requirements, this is
difficult to achieve. So what will best help the current
generation and what are the implications for the next
generation of directors and board chairs? 
• If these are considered to be corporate leaders enacting
corporate leadership, what does their conduct and
performance say to people both inside and outside their
companies and particularly those aspiring to such
leadership positions?
• How can the persistent challenge of achieving an
appropriate level of executive reward and incentives in
return for ‘high performance’ be best addressed and by
whom?
• If investors are effectively being expected to act as
corporate guardians at a time when the ownership
relationship is further weakening, what are the implications
for future shareholder engagement practice in enacting
this ownership relationship?
In concluding this synopsis, it feels as Lewis Carroll’s Walrus
famously put it, “the time has come to talk of many things”.
While this will undoubtedly be the case in ten years time,
clearly the ongoing dialogue, directing and corporate sense-
making process ensures there is much yet to happen.
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